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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1804
________________
STEVEN C. THOMPSON,
               Appellant
       v.
EVA'S VILLAGE AND SHELTERING PROGRAM;
DERRICK WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY;
GREGORY ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY;
GLORY PEREZ, INDIVIDUALLY;
ANTHONY MCCANTS, INDIVIDUALLY;
BRYANT JENKINS, INDIVIDUALLY;
GREATER PATERSON AREA, INC.;
WORLD SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC.;
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC.
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02548)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2007
Before:   RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: June 18, 2007)
2_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Steven Thompson appeals the District Court’s order granting appellees’ motions
for summary judgment.  The procedural history of this case and the details of appellant’s
claims are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s opinion, and need
not be discussed at length.  Briefly, Thompson alleged in his complaint that he was barred
from a Narcotics Anonymous meeting based on his religious beliefs.  He alleged that
appellees’ actions violated his constitutional rights as well as federal and state statutes. 
The District Court granted appellees’ motions for summary judgment, and Thompson
filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  Gallo v.
City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of summary judgment
will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).  We review the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary
judgment was entered.  See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins.
Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
Thompson argues on appeal that the District Court failed to reasonably
3accommodate his disability.  However, he does not specify any accommodation he
required which was denied.  In the District Court he asked the District Court to stop
“rushing the proceedings, raising unrelated, irrelevant or confusing issues to distract me”
as well as “denying oral argument or telephone conference.”  The docket reflects that the
District Court granted Thompson several extensions of time.  Thompson has not
explained why he was entitled to oral argument; his voluminous filings demonstrate that
he was able to communicate with the Court through his written pleadings.  
Thompson argues that the appellees are not entitled to immunity under the New
Jersey Charitable Immunity Act.  However, in its November 14, 2005, letter order, the
District Court noted that Charitable Immunity Act only applies to claims of negligence
and that Thompson had not raised any negligence claims.  The District Court concluded
that the Charitable Immunity Act was inapplicable.
Thompson contends that the appellees were acting as agents of the state when they
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  We agree with the District Court
that the appellees are not state actors.  See, e.g., Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 341 (3d
Cir. 2005) (regulation and receipt of government funds, without more, does not constitute
state action).  Thus, Thompson’s claims arising under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, § 1983, and § 1985 fail.  We further agree with the District Court that
appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Thompson’s claims arising under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e.
4Thompson argues that appellees violated his rights under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination.  However, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Thompson’s New Jersey state law claims.  The District Court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction or in denying
Thompson’s motion to amend his complaint.
Finally, we address Thompson’s arguments that District Court Judge Pisano and
Magistrate Judge Arleo should have recused themselves.  A litigant’s displeasure with the
District Court’s legal rulings is not an adequate basis for recusal. Securacomm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Thompson argues
that his filing a lawsuit against Judges Pisano and Arleo is a ground for recusal.  
This Court has already addressed this issue in a prior appeal in this case.  In
Thompson v. Eva’s Village, C.A. No. 05-4618, we thoroughly addressed Thompson’s
allegations and informed him that his lawsuit against the Judges did not provide a basis
for recusal.  Thompson’s unfounded accusations against the District Court Judges and
their staff are inappropriate.  “Litigants are understandably disappointed when they do not
prevail in court, but that does not give them the license to attack the integrity of the
judiciary.  Such abusive conduct will not be tolerated, not even from a pro se litigant.”  In
re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 2000).
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Thompson’s motion for attorneys fees and costs is
5denied.  Thompson is neither an attorney nor the prevailing party.  See 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b).  Thompson’s motions to strike appellee Greater Paterson Area’s brief and for
sanctions are denied.
